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IN DEFENSE OF THE DEALERS: WHY THE SEC
SHOULD ALLOW SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE
WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION
FOR SECURITY-BASED SWAP DEALERS
John Welling*
Following the 2008–2009 financial crisis, legislators around the world
enacted laws that regulated the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets
for the first time. These laws, though necessary, have duplicative
requirements that dampen market efficiency. In the United States, the
Securities and Exchange Commission is contemplating a “substituted
compliance” regime with other jurisdictions. This regime would allow
market participants to comply with one jurisdiction’s requirements for
certain transactions, rather than the requirements of multiple jurisdictions.
This Note argues that the SEC should allow substituted compliance for
OTC derivatives, but only for dealers located in the United States and
European Union. Some advocate for a broader substituted compliance
regime. These arguments, however, overlook nuances of the SEC’s
announced approach. Others argue that the SEC should avoid substituted
compliance altogether.
Ultimately, if the SEC allows substituted
compliance narrowly and thoughtfully, it could preserve the economic
benefits of a domestic financial market, while preventing some causes of the
recent financial crisis.
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INTRODUCTION
On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama explained to a crowd in the
Ronald Regan building that the United States had recently “faced the worst
recession since the Great Depression.”1 He was referring to the financial
crisis of 2008–2009 (“financial crisis”), when “[t]ens of millions saw the
value of their homes and retirement savings plummet” and countless
businesses were unable to get the loans they needed, forcing many “to shut
their doors.”2 Of course, the financial devastation was not contained to the
United States, as people around the world suffered.3 In the aftermath of the
1. President Barack Obama, Remarks on Signing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD201000617/pdf/DCPD-201000617.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN46-CVXA].
2. Id.
3. See Directorate-Gen. for Econ. & Fin. Affairs, European Comm’n, Economic Crisis
in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses, EUR. ECON., Sept. 2009, at 1, 1 (“EU real
GDP is projected to shrink by some 4% in 2009, the sharpest contraction in its history.”); see
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financial crisis, it became apparent that there was no singular cause.4 Yet
no group was more publicly vilified for its role than large financial
companies.5 Many companies had speculated with over-the-counter (OTC)
derivatives.6 They lost tremendous sums, while spreading financial damage
through the interconnected global markets they had created.7 President
Obama cited a “failure of responsibility, from certain corners of Wall Street
to the halls of power in Washington,” as the primary cause of the financial
crisis.8
In 2009, leaders from the G209 governments met to discuss the financial
crisis and to create legislation that would both better regulate their financial
markets and prevent another crisis.10 Ultimately, they decided each
jurisdiction would enact its own legislation based upon “shared policy
objectives”11 rather than a supranational approach by the entire G20.12 In
also Inci Otker-Robe & Anca Maria Podpiera, Seeing the Human Face of the Global
LET’S TALK DEV. (Nov. 4, 2013),
Financial Crisis, WORLD BANK:
http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/seeing-human-face-global-financial-crisis
[https://perma.cc/G6YM-BLCS].
4. See Crash Course, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), http://www.economist.com/
news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article
[https://perma.cc/DBU6-LKGT].
5. See, e.g., Zachary A. Goldfarb, Goldman Sachs Executives Face Senators
Investigating Role in Financial Crisis, WASH. POST (Apr. 28, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/27/AR20100427023
26.html (“It was a day of public flogging for Goldman Sachs.”) [https://perma.cc/TKR5WL9M].
6. Shah Gilani, The Real Reason for the Global Financial Crisis . . . the Story No One’s
Talking About, MONEY MORNING (Sept. 18, 2008), http://moneymorning.com/
2008/09/18/credit-default-swaps/ [https://perma.cc/C5Q6-XZ7T]. Financial derivatives are
instruments that derive value from the performance of an underlying asset, such as a stock or
commodity. See Financial Derivatives, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://www.imf.org/
external/np/sta/fd/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/278G-VFHX]. The sellers of
OTC derivatives are referred to as “dealers,” and typically purchasers are referred to as “end
users.” Sean J. Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How to Make a Global
Market in Derivatives Regulation, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1291, 1298 (2014). Dealers and end
users, together “counterparties,” typically use derivatives as a form of hedging, or financial
risk management. Id. at 1295 (describing derivatives as “a contractual means by which
parties allocate the risk of a fluctuation in price of an underlying reference asset”); see also
The Mercatus Energy Pipeline: The Fundamentals of Oil & Gas Hedging—Swaps,
MERCATUS ENERGY ADVISORS (July 12, 2016) [hereinafter MERCATUS ENERGY ADVISORS],
http://www.mercatusenergy.com/blog/bid/86598/The-Fundamentals-of-Oil-Gas-HedgingSwaps (discussing the use of swaps, a form of OTC derivative, for hedging)
[https://perma.cc/2AB5-UR4Q]. Some counterparties speculate with derivatives, however,
to earn trading profits. See Gilani, supra.
7. See Gilani, supra note 6.
8. Obama, supra note 1.
9. See generally Jamil Mustafa, What Is the G20 and How Does It Work?, TELEGRAPH
(Sept. 3, 2016, 10:47 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/g20-summit/5075115/G20what-is-it-and-how-does-it-work.html [https://perma.cc/TMK9-PHS3]. The G20 members
include Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia,
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, the United States of America, and the European Union. Id.
10. See generally Leaders’ Statement, G-20, The Pittsburg Summit 1 (Sept. 25, 2009),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/g7-g20/Documents/pittsburgh_
summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf [https://perma.cc/TY3W-TJXB].
11. Id. at 6.
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the United States, this G20 commitment resulted in the enactment of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act13 (“DoddFrank Act” or “Dodd-Frank”).
The shared policy objectives of the G20 led to similar legislation across
its jurisdictions, which in turn created an issue for buyers and sellers of
OTC derivatives (“market participants”).14
During cross-border
transactions, market participants must comply with legal requirements that
are duplicative and not quite uniform, and the totality of compliance
threatens to undermine the profitability of their OTC derivatives
businesses.15 The American agencies charged with regulating the OTC
derivatives market under Dodd-Frank, the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or
“the Commission”), then faced their own issue. They could maintain the
new legal landscape for OTC derivatives, and potentially dampen the
productivity of the American economy,16 or they could grant some relief to
the OTC derivatives industry, including many vilified financial companies,
and hope that their actions would not result in another financial crisis.17
The CFTC chose to grant relief through “substituted compliance”
determinations for eight foreign jurisdictions.18 Substituted compliance
allows certain sellers of OTC derivatives to satisfy American legal
requirements by satisfying another jurisdiction’s requirements.19 In 2013,
the SEC announced it would also consider a substituted compliance
scheme, but to date it has not made any determinations.20 This Note argues
that the SEC should make a substituted compliance determination, allowing
certain financial companies to substitute their compliance with European
OTC derivatives laws for their compliance with equivalent American
laws.21 Though this would grant relief to financial companies partially
responsible for the financial crisis, it is a compromise that addresses the
legitimate issues these companies currently face, the intentions of the G20,
and the purposes of Dodd-Frank, including protecting the financial markets
and preventing another crisis.22
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of the role of OTC
derivatives in the financial crisis and the different approaches taken by the
United States and the European Union to prevent a recurrence of the last
crisis. Part II then outlines the arguments in favor and against a substituted
compliance regime for the regulation of OTC derivatives. Finally, Part III
proposes a method of substituted compliance for certain market participants
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See generally id.
See Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part I.B.1.
See infra Part I.B.1.
See infra Part I.B.3.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
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in a way that balances the risks, rewards, and goals of OTC derivatives
regulation.
I. HOW THEY GOT TO SUBSTITUTED COMPLIANCE
Though dealers and end users, known collectively as counterparties, use
OTC derivatives to mitigate risks, their speculative use by some
counterparties, especially in cross-border transactions, contributed
significantly to the financial crisis.23 As discussed, the resulting legislation
in G20 jurisdictions created cross-border issues that led to the crossroads
the SEC faces regarding substituted compliance.24 Part I.A begins with a
summary of the role of OTC derivatives in the financial crisis. Part I.B
surveys the legal responses to the financial crisis in the United States,
beginning with the response of the CFTC and moving to that of the SEC.
Finally, Part I.C surveys the European Union’s legal response.
A. OTC Derivatives
and Their Role in the Financial Crisis
OTC derivatives25 are privately negotiated bilateral contracts that trade
without an intermediary between the counterparties.26 Historically, there
was no centralized oversight of OTC derivatives markets and little
government regulation,27 as counterparties used OTC derivatives primarily
to mitigate risks through hedging.28 In the years leading up to the financial
crisis, however, some large financial institutions in these decentralized and
unregulated markets used substantial amounts of OTC derivatives to
speculate.29 These speculative derivatives predominantly had forms of
credit as the underlying asset.30 They included the “collateralized debt

23. See infra Part I.A.
24. See infra Part I.A–B.
25. The other broad category of derivatives is the exchange-traded derivative, which is
highly standardized and traded through an intermediary. Griffith, supra note 6, at 1297–98.
This Note does not focus on exchange-traded derivatives, as they were not a significant
cause of the financial crisis. See Gilani, supra note 6.
26. Griffith, supra note 6, at 1298.
27. See generally Leaders’ Statement, G-20, supra note 10.
28. See, e.g., MERCATUS ENERGY ADVISORS, supra note 6.
29. See Gilani, supra note 6 (writing that the outstanding notional amount of one popular
form of speculative OTC derivative was $62 trillion according to the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA)). As of 2011, the OTC derivatives market was
estimated as exceeding $700 trillion of total notional amount, or $20 trillion if all
transactions were settled simultaneously. John C. Coffee, Jr., Extraterritorial Financial
Regulation: Why E.T. Can’t Come Home, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1272 n.38 (2014).
30. See Crash Course, supra note 4; see also Griffith, supra note 6, at 1304–06.
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obligation”31 (CDO) and a subform of the generic “swap,”32 referred to as
the “credit-default swap”33 (CDS).
In the United States, financial firms purchased these credit derivatives
with mortgages as the underlying form of credit.34 When the American real
estate bubble burst in 2008, borrowers defaulted on the mortgage payments
underlying the derivatives, which led speculative purchasers to default on
their payments to other counterparties.35 Given the substantial speculative
position of some financial institutions,36 losses on credit derivatives
rendered some of them insolvent and threatened the solvency of others.37
This led to fears of runs on the financial institutions and, ultimately, to
bailouts of some institutions by the federal government.38
Often, these credit derivatives were cross-border transactions,39 which
exposed American financial institutions to the credit risk of foreign
counterparties and foreign counterparties to the risk of insolvent American
institutions.40 The market was interconnected globally.41 Cross-border
OTC derivatives were the lynchpin of a systemic risk that threatened a
global financial contagion.42
The 2009 summit of G20 leaders was an attempt to address the structural
issues stemming from the financial crisis, including those caused by OTC

31. Griffith, supra note 6, at 1304–06.
32. In a “swap” derivative transaction, counterparties agree to exchange payments based
on the value of an underlying asset over time. Griffith, supra note 6, at 1295. Swaps involve
at least two risks: (1) the fluctuation in value of the underlying assets and (2) the possibility
that one counterparty will become insolvent and fail to complete payment under the contract.
Id. at 1300.
33. See Gilani, supra note 6. Counterparties agree to receive interest payments in
exchange for insuring against the default of an underlying form of credit (typically a loan or
bond). See Griffith, supra note 6, at 1298–99. However, counterparties do not need to lend
the money for the underlying credit form; thus, CDSs allow counterparties to speculate on
any form of credit more easily. Id.
34. Mortgages were pooled together for use in derivatives. See Crash Course, supra note
4; see also Griffith, supra note 6, at 1304–06.
35. See, e.g., Adam Davidson, The Big Money: How AIG Fell Apart, REUTERS (Sept.
19, 2008, 10:27 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/19/us-how-aig-fell-apartidUSMAR85972720080919 [https://perma.cc/X4CD-EAHY].
36. Griffith, supra note 6, at 1304 (describing the “overexposure” of financial
institutions to housing through CDOs).
37. See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merril is Sold, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 14, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/MUA6-XGJS].
Issues over valuing credit
derivatives also contributed to the losses and ultimate insolvency of financial institutions.
See Griffith, supra note 6, at 1306.
38. See Griffith, supra note 6, at 1307; see also Gilani, supra note 6.
39. A cross-border transaction is between two counterparties in different jurisdictions.
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a71-3 (2016).
40. See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1262 (discussing AIG’s purchase of CDSs
through a British subsidiary).
41. See GUILIO GIRARDI, CRAIG LEWIS & MILA GETMANSKY, SEC,
INTERCONNECTEDNESS IN THE CDS MARKET 1 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/
white-papers/credit-defaul-swaps-interconnectivity-04-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TRW8CAW4].
42. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1262.
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derivatives, and to prevent another crisis.43 They agreed to not only
regulate the OTC derivatives market within their home jurisdictions44 but
also to cooperate in regulating the global marketplace.45 Legislation
throughout the developed financial world ensued.46
B. Almost to Substituted Compliance: American Legal Responses
to the OTC Derivatives Market Post-Financial Crisis
To realize the G20 goals for the OTC derivatives market, Congress
enacted Title VII of Dodd-Frank,47 which amended the Commodity
Exchange Act48 and the Securities Exchange Act.49 Through Dodd-Frank,
Congress split regulatory jurisdiction over derivatives between the CFTC
and the SEC based on the underlying asset of the product.50 The CFTC
would have jurisdiction over swaps, while the SEC would have jurisdiction
over “security-based swaps” (SBSs).51 Because the SEC regulates the
underlying securities, Congress granted oversight over SBSs to the SEC,
rather than the CFTC.52 Though swaps and SBSs are economically
similar,53 the split reflected the CFTC’s and SEC’s existing jurisdictional
scopes.54 Congress also mandated that the SEC and CFTC fully define the
entities and transactions described in Title VII.55
43. Leaders’ Statement, G-20, supra note 10, at 7.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) pt 7.5A (Austl.); Council
Regulation 648/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1.
47. Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. VII, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641–802 (2010).
48. 7 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2012).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78c.
50. See generally Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “SecurityBased Swap Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping,
77 Fed. Reg. 48,208 (Aug. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 240, 241).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(68)(A) (“[T]he term security-based swap means any agreement,
contract, or transaction that is a swap . . . under section 1(a) of the Commodity Exchange
Act . . . and is based on . . . the occurrence, nonoccurrence, or extent of the occurrence of an
event relating to a single issuer of a security or the issuers of securities in a narrow-based
security index.”).
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c; see also id. § 78b (“[T]ransactions in securities as commonly
conducted upon . . . over-the-counter markets are affected with a national public interest
which makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such transactions.”).
53. See Dodd-Frank Essentials for End Users of OTC Derivatives—Update 1, SIDLEY
AUSTIN LLP 1–2 (Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.sidley.com/~/media/Files/News/2010/08/
What%20Is%20a%20Swap/Files/View%20Update%20in%20PDF%20Format/FileAttachme
nt/investment%20funds%20update%2081710 [https://perma.cc/ZXE2-5JJJ]. Additionally,
many large financial companies transact in both swaps and SBSs. See, e.g., Don Thompson,
U.S. Financial Regulatory Reform and the Evolving OTC Landscape, JP MORGAN (Jan. 17,
2012), https://www.jpmorgan.com/jpmpdf/1320605430085.pdf (discussing the regulatory
differences between products) [https://perma.cc/M8XX-4LVX].
54. See Derivatives, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/derivatives.shtml
(last modified May. 4, 2015) (stating that Congress included SBSs under the definition of
security by amending the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934)
[https://perma.cc/W9RH-NFC2].
55. 15 U.S.C. § 8302(d)(1) (directing the CFTC and the SEC to further define the terms
“swap,” “security-based swap,” and “swap dealer”).
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To fulfill their obligations under Dodd-Frank, the CFTC and SEC had to
define the limits and requirements applicable to OTC derivatives
counterparties and determine the operation of those requirements to
Part I.B.1 below
counterparties during cross-border transactions.56
summarizes the CFTC’s resulting regulatory scheme and cross-border
approach. Part I.B.2 analyzes the SEC’s regulations in-depth, while Part
I.B.3 summarizes the SEC’s application of its requirements to cross-border
SBSs.
1. The CFTC’s Regulations and Cross-Border Approach
Under Dodd-Frank, the CFTC eschewed formal rulemaking and adopted
a regulatory framework through interpretive guidance and policy statements
that created a set of responsibilities for swaps counterparties.57 It then
asserted a general policy that these requirements may apply to cross-border
swaps with a “direct and significant connection with activities in, or effect
on, commerce of the United States.”58 Though the application of these
requirements would be flexible,59 the CFTC intended to regulate crossborder transactions that posed risks to the U.S. economy.60 The result of
the CFTC’s policy was that foreign counterparties often were subject to the
CFTC’s requirements when they transacted with American counterparties.61
The CFTC focused on harmonization with other regulators, as it
recognized that the swaps market would be regulated for the first time.62
This included consultation with the SEC “in an effort to increase
understanding of each other’s regulatory approaches and to harmonize the
cross-border approaches of the two agencies.”63 The agencies’ objective
was to coordinate their cross-border approaches “to the greatest extent
56. See infra Part I.B.1–3.
57. See generally Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance
with Certain Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. 45,291 (July 26, 2013) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. ch. 1). This framework includes numerous transaction-level and entity-level
requirements for swaps counterparties. See id. Entity-level requirements apply to a firm as a
whole, while transaction-level requirements apply to firms on a transaction-by-transaction
basis. See Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain
Swap Regulations, CFTC 1–2 http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/
documents/file/crossborder_factsheet_final.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/
6BHT-QNG9].
58. See Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain
Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,297.
59. See id. (“Unlike a binding rule adopted by the Commission . . . this Guidance is a
statement of the Commission’s general policy . . . and allows for flexibility in application to
various situations, including consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances.”).
60. See id. at 45,295 (stating that the vulnerabilities stemming from the interconnected
global swaps market in part demonstrates the need for cross-border swaps regulations); see
also Edward F. Greene & Ilona Potiha, Examining the Extraterritorial Reach of DoddFrank’s Volcker Rule and Margin Rules for Uncleared Swaps—A Call for Regulatory
Coordination and Cooperation, 7 CAP. MARKETS L.J. 271, 275–78 (2012).
61. See Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 282.
62. See Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain
Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,296. The CFTC also acknowledged “many
jurisdictions are in differing stages of implementing their regulatory reform.” Id.
63. See id.
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possible.”64 This objective was, however, neither required nor binding on
either agency.65 The CFTC also coordinated with international regulators
before releasing its cross-border guidance.66
In pursuit of global harmonization, the CFTC instituted a substituted
compliance regime.67 Substituted compliance allows foreign counterparties
in cross-border transactions to satisfy CFTC regulatory requirements by
satisfying their home jurisdiction’s regulatory requirements.68 As part of
this regime, the CFTC issued informal comparability determinations
between its regulatory requirements and those of foreign jurisdictions.69
Regulators in the United States had narrowly used substituted compliance
before,70 so the CFTC’s determinations were not novel.71 The CFTC
intended its framework to allow foreign regulators latitude for their
regulatory interests72 and to mitigate the burdens of conflicting or
Substituted
duplicative regulations for non-U.S. counterparties.73
compliance would not, however, compromise “the high level of regulation
contemplated by the Dodd-Frank Act” to protect the United States from
another financial crisis.74
2. The SEC’s Regulations In-Depth
Pursuant to its rulemaking authority under Dodd-Frank, the SEC
implemented regulations for SBSs similar to those of the CFTC for

64. Id.
65. Id. (acknowledging the differences between the two agencies’ approaches).
66. Id. (recognizing that, in the highly interconnected derivatives market, “risks are
transmitted across national borders and market participants operate in multiple
jurisdictions”).
67. See Comparability Determinations for Substituted Compliance Purposes, CFTC
(Dec.
27,
2013),
http://www.cftc.gov/LawRegulation/DoddFrankAct/CDSCP/
DoddFrankCDF5 [hereinafter CFTC, Comparability Determinations] [https://perma.cc/
YY9C-V5HV].
68. See Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain
Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,340. Foreign counterparties and regulators are eligible
to apply for substituted compliance determinations by the CFTC. Id. at 45,344. The CFTC
analyzes the applicable foreign laws and regulations to determine potential equivalency
before granting substituted compliance for a jurisdiction or counterparty. Id.
69. See, e.g., Comparability Determination for the European Union:
Certain
Transaction-Level Requirements, 78 Fed. Reg. 78,878 (Dec. 27, 2013).
70. See, e.g., Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 310–11. In 2008, the SEC and an
Australian regulatory agency implemented substituted compliance for certain stock
exchanges and broker-dealers in each country to operate without having to comply with
duplicative regulations. Id.
71. In 2013, the CFTC made eight equivalency determinations for other jurisdictions,
including for both entity and transaction-level requirements in the European Union. See
CFTC, Comparability Determinations, supra note 67. This was a series of “broad
comparability determinations.” Id.
72. See Interpretive Guidance and Policy Statement Regarding Compliance with Certain
Swap Regulations, 78 Fed. Reg. at 45,301, 45,340–41.
73. See id. at 45,340–41.
74. See id. at 45,340.

918

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

swaps.75 Like the CFTC, the SEC requires counterparties to register with
it,76 report information to data repositories,77 and maintain minimum levels
of capital78 and margin.79 The reporting, recordkeeping, capital, and
margin requirements are analyzed below.
a. Capital and Margin Requirements
Of the requirements mandated by Dodd-Frank, and derivatives
regulations globally, capital and margin requirements are especially
important to commenters.80 Independent “third-party custodian[s]” hold the
capital and margin funds that counterparties allocate for SBSs in segregated
accounts.81 The more counterparties allocate funds to satisfy these
requirements, the fewer funds they have to complete new SBS
transactions.82 Therefore, duplicative capital and margin requirements can

75. Implementing the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,
SEC, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dodd-frank.shtml (last modified July 7, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/F72R-CJAQ].
76. See e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.15Fb2-1 (2016) (requiring all counterparties to register
with the SEC as either “security-based swap dealers” or “major security-based swap
participants”); id. § 242.901 (listing the reporting obligations of counterparties involved in
SBS transactions). There are de minimis thresholds for registration with the Commission,
and, therefore, only dealers and market participants who trade in significant amounts are
subject to the full panoply of SEC regulations. Fact Sheet: Defining Swaps-Related Terms,
SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/
Article/1365171492905 (last modified July 29, 2014) [https://perma.cc/7YJ7-3X3T].
77. See infra Part I.B.3.
78. See Capital requirements are funds specifically designated as a cushion to protect
against runs by creditors in the event a financial firm’s assets decline or its liabilities rise.
DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, BROOKINGS INST., A PRIMER ON BANK CAPITAL (2010),
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/1/29-capital-elliott/0129_
capital_primer_elliott.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WAP-VXGK].
79. Margin requirements are funds that counterparties must maintain on deposit in their
accounts for individual trades. See Maintenance Margin Requirement, NASDAQ,
http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/m/maintenance-margin-requirement (last visited
Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/V4CL-WE36].
80. See Reopening of Comment Periods for Certain Rulemaking Releases and Policy
Statement Applicable to Security-Based Swaps, Exchange Act Release No. 34-69,491, 106
SEC Docket 1080 (Feb. 11, 2014). The SEC has reopened the comment period for the rules
as of fall 2016. Id. The Commission originally proposed capital and margin requirements for
SBS counterparties in November of 2012. See Capital, Margin, and Segregation
Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants
and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,214 (proposed Nov. 23,
2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78c-5(f)(3) (2012).
82. See ELLIOT, supra note 78; see also Maintenance Margin Requirement, supra note
79. The prudential regulators, which include the Federal Reserve Board, also have
regulatory interest in the capital of SBS dealers. See Capital, Margin, and Segregation
Requirements for Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants
and Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 70,217 (“The Commission
staff consulted with the prudential regulators.”). Though the requirements of these
regulators affect the capital of SBS dealers indirectly, see Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at
276, these effects are outside the scope of this Note.
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be administratively inconvenient and profit suppressing for
counterparties.83
The SEC’s capital and margin requirements for SBSs are proposed but
not finalized.84 Under the proposed capital rules, SBS dealers would be
subject to a separate rule, not applicable to other securities dealers, that
would protect customer assets and mitigate the risks of counterparty failure
while allowing firms flexibility in how they conduct business.85 This
standalone rule would impose a “net liquid assets” test on all SBS dealers,
requiring the dealers to maintain a minimum level of net capital at all
times.86 More generally, the capital rules impose substantially higher
minimum capital requirements for SBS dealers because the use of internal
models for proprietary transactions can “substantially reduce” some
standardized deductions prescribed by the rules.87 The Commission is
especially concerned with the ways SBS dealers value their transactions and
prescribe capital based off these valuations because of risks that the SBS
dealers will fail to properly value transactions.88 There are also higher
minimum requirements for dealers who engage in brokerage activities, as
compared to those who engage solely in dealing, because of the substantial
increase in importance and risk of brokerage activities in the securities
market.89
For its SBS margin requirements, the SEC also based its approach off of
preexisting broker-dealer requirements.90 The Commission acknowledged
it was imposing margin requirements on OTC SBS dealers for the first
83. See Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 300 n.130.
84. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
85. See Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based Swap
Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for BrokerDealers, 77 Fed. Reg. at 70,218.
86. Id. at 70,219 (“This standard is designed to promote liquidity; the rule allows a
broker-dealer to engage . . . in a manner that places the firm in the position of holding at all
times more than one dollar of highly liquid assets for each dollar of unsubordinated liabilities
(e.g., money owed to customers, counterparties, and creditors).”). Net capital is highly
liquid capital, reserves of cash, or liquid securities. Id. The net capital test requires the
dealer to determine how much net capital it must maintain over how much it is maintaining.
Id. The minimum amount of net capital is the “greater of a fixed-dollar amount specified in
the rule and an amount determined by applying one of two financial ratios,” either a fifteento-one aggregate debt to net capital ratio or a 2 percent of aggregate debit items ratio. Id. In
computing net capital, dealers also would have to make a number of adjustments and
deductions, including taking prescribed percentage deductions from mark-to-market
proprietary positions that are included in its tentative net capital. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. Since dealers have an important position in the SBS market, and, therefore, have
an increased capacity for perpetuating systemic market risk, they are subject to a more
stringent net liquid asset test than other market participants. Id. at 70,220 (discussing test for
MSBSPs).
89. Id. at 70,228 (stating that broker-dealers are important intermediaries and that their
internal models are more risk sensitive, but may not capture all risks). For those dealers who
engage solely in dealing, there is a $20 million fixed dollar minimum and $100 million
tentative net capital requirement, as compared to a $1 billion fixed dollar minimum and $5
billion tentative net capital requirement for dealers who also engage in brokerage activities.
Id. at 70,220.
90. See id. at 70,259.
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time.91 Under these rules, counterparties would have to maintain a
specified level of their transacting partner’s equity in a securities account,
which they could liquidate to satisfy obligations in instances of
nonpayment.92 The amount of required funds depends on the nature of the
transaction and its accompanying risk.93
b. Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements
The SEC announced a number of significant reporting and recordkeeping
requirements for SBS counterparties in a 2013 release,94 some of which
were adopted in Regulation SBSR.95 Under these requirements, a
counterparty must establish, document, and maintain a comprehensive
“system of internal risk management controls to assist in managing the risks
associated with its business.”96 They must also implement internal systems
and controls that establish and enforce procedures to obtain any necessary
information to perform required functions under the Securities Exchange
Act and provide this information to the SEC.97
Building off of these requirements, the SEC requires that counterparties
keep books and records of all activities related to their SBS business and
report these books and records to the Commission.98 In addition to
reporting, counterparties must keep their books and records open to the
SEC for inspection and examination,99 exercise diligent supervision,100 and
ensure there are no conflicts of interest with their clients.101 They must also
have a chief compliance officer and adhere to licensing requirements and

91. Id. at 70,258 (stating that there would be margin requirements for all SBSs that are
not cleared). Under Dodd-Frank, the Commission will impose initial and variation margin.
Id. The initiative was to address the fact that some dealers “experienced large
uncollateralized exposures to counterparties experiencing financial difficulty, which, in turn,
risked exacerbating the already severe market dislocation” during the financial crisis. Id.
92. Id. at 70,259.
93. Id.
94. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968 (proposed May 23, 2013)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249).
95. See Regulation SBSR—Reporting and Dissemination of Security-Based Swap
Information, 80 Fed. Reg. 14,740 (proposed Mar. 19, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
242).
96. Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR and
Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and
Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,013. These risk management
systems would require counterparties to formally document trades. Id.
97. See id. at 31,013–14.
98. See id. This includes daily trading records, terms and conditions of SBSs, SBS
trading operations, mechanisms and practices, financial integrity protections, and other
relevant information. See id. at 31,013.
99. See id. at 31,015.
100. See id. at 31,014.
101. See id. (“Such policies and procedures must establish structural and institutional
safeguards to ensure that the activities of any person within the firm relating to
[SBSs] . . . are separated by appropriate informational partitions.”).
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statutory disqualifications.102 Finally, the SEC has “external business
conduct standards”103 and requires the segregation of client assets by
counterparties.104
3. The SEC’s Cross-Border Approach
As the CFTC decided with swaps,105 the SEC elected to subject any
transactions involving an American counterparty to the above requirements
for its cross-border approach.106 Therefore, when transacting with
American counterparties, foreign SBS counterparties had to comply with
SEC requirements.107
The Commission stated this approach was “grounded in the text of”
Dodd-Frank108 but also acknowledged that “cross-border transactions are
the norm, not the exception.”109 Under the SEC’s cross-border approach,
foreign counterparties transacting in the United States, and American
counterparties transacting abroad, faced potentially duplicative
requirements if another jurisdiction’s requirements were equivalent to those
of the SEC.110 Duplicative requirements, again, can impair business

102. Id. at 31,014–15. Licensing requirements and statutory disqualification prevent
potential abuse of SBSs by those already disqualified from the industry by statute. See id. at
31,015.
103. Id. at 31,010. These standards require that SBS dealers “(i) [v]erify that a
counterparty meets the eligibility standards for an ECP; (ii) disclose to the counterparty
material information about the security-based swap . . . ; and (iii) provide the counterparty
with information concerning the daily mark for the security-based swap.” Id.
104. See id. (stating that “segregation requirements are designed to identify and protect
customer property” that SBS counterparties hold as collateral).
105. See supra Part I.B.1.
106. See Application of “Security-Based Swap Dealer” and “Major Security-Based Swap
Participant” Definitions to Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 79 Fed. Reg.
47,278 (Aug. 12, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 241, 250) (“[I]t is appropriate
to impose the statutory requirements, and rules or regulations thereunder, on security-based
swap activity occurring within the United States even if certain conduct in connection with
the security-based swap also occurs in part outside the United States.”); see also Application
of Certain Title VII Requirements to Security-Based Swap Transactions Connected with a
Non-U.S. Person’s Dealing Activity That Are Arranged, Negotiated, or Executed by
Personnel Located in a U.S. Branch or Office or in a U.S. Branch or Office of an Agent, 80
Fed. Reg. 27,444 (proposed May 13, 2015) (to be codified at 17. C.F.R. pts. 240, 242)
(defining which types of transactions and counterparties are within the SEC’s jurisdiction).
107. See, e.g., Application of “Security-Based Swap Dealer” and “Major Security-Based
Swap Participant” Definitions to Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 79 Fed. Reg.
at 47,301 (allowing for the de minimis exception, but requiring registration by non-U.S.
dealers); see also Application of “Security-Based Swap Dealer” and “Major Security-Based
Swap Participant” Definitions to Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 80 Fed. Reg.
at 27,444.
108. See Application of “Security-Based Swap Dealer” and “Major Security-Based Swap
Participant” Definitions to Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. at
47,287.
109. Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR and
Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and
Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. at 30,976.
110. Id. at 30,974.
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efficiency.111 Therefore, the Commission announced that it would consider
adopting its own substituted compliance framework to address this issue.112
At adoption of its cross-border guidance, however, the Commission
stated, “we expect to address issues regarding the availability of substituted
compliance as part of future rulemakings” in conjunction with the crossborder application of specific rules.113 It had previously listed the
necessary Title VII requirements for a substituted compliance
determination.114 In its proposed capital and margin guidance, the
Commission did not mention substituted compliance,115 but it has addressed
the topic in subsequent releases.116
Though it reviewed the CFTC’s substituted compliance scheme,117 the
SEC ultimately decided it would only allow substituted compliance in a
different form.118 It would not complete a rule-by-rule comparison against
111. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
112. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,085. The Commission only
provided guidance and procedures for substituted compliance of SBS dealers, not major SBS
participants. Id. at 31,088–89.
113. Application of “Security-Based Swap Dealer” and “Major Security-Based Swap
Participant” Definitions to Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 79 Fed. Reg. at
47,358. The Commission did adopt a procedural rule for foreign jurisdictions to apply for
substituted compliance determinations. Id.
114. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,088–90. The requirements
the Commission listed are those requirements described in Part I.B.2.
115. See generally Capital, Margin, and Segregation Requirements for Security-Based
Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants and Capital Requirements for
Broker-Dealers, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,214 (proposed Nov. 23, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 240). The SEC expects to address the availability of substituted compliance for specific
requirements in each requirement’s rulemaking. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
Thus, the Commission will most likely address the potential for substituted compliance in its
final capital and margin guidance. For the purposes of this Note, however, the proposed
rules are used to assess the SEC’s position on these requirements.
116. See Regulation SBSR—Reporting and Dissemination of Security-Based Swap
Information, Exchange Act Release No. 34-74,244, 2015 WL 1266798, at *152 (Feb. 11
2015) [hereinafter Regulation SBSR Release No. 34-74244] (“The Commission may issue a
substituted compliance determination if it finds that the corresponding requirements of the
foreign regulatory system are comparable to the relevant provisions of Regulation SBSR. . . .
The availability of substituted compliance is designed to reduce the likelihood of crossborder market participants being subject to potentially conflicting or duplicative reporting
requirements.”).
117. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,097.
118. Id. at 31,088. Instead of providing informal interpretive guidance like that of the
CFTC, see supra Part I.B.1, the SEC would undertake formal rulemakings to determine the
availability of substituted compliance generally and whether specific jurisdictions would
qualify for it. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation
SBSR and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap
Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,087–88. The
Commission may only allow substituted compliance after it determines that foreign
requirements are “comparable” to those of the SEC, id. at 30,088, and are accompanied by
effective supervisory and enforcement programs, id. at 31,088 n.1119. It also would require
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other jurisdictions’ regulations.119 The Commission stated it would focus
on “regulatory outcomes as a whole.”120 Using its “holistic,” “outcomesbased” approach, the Commission would have to conclude that another
jurisdiction had the “reporting of data elements comparable to those
required” by the Commission.121 It did not, however, assess the
equivalence of any foreign SBS regulations to its own.122 Currently, it has
neither made any substituted compliance determinations nor declared
whether it will make any determinations.123
C. The European Legal Response to OTC Derivatives
After the Financial Crisis
The European Union, unlike the United States, regulated a small portion
of the OTC derivatives market prior to the financial crisis through its
Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments (MiFID 1).124 In 2012,
however, the European Union enacted the European Markets Infrastructure
Regulation (EMIR) to focus on OTC derivatives pursuant to the 2009 G20
agreements,125 along with three directives specifically focused on OTC
EMIR implemented several requirements, including
derivatives.126
information and recordkeeping requirements.127 In 2013, a regulation128
a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the foreign jurisdiction’s supervisory and
enforcement programs. Id.
119. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,085.
120. Id.
121. Regulation SBSR Release No. 34-74244, supra note 116, at *168. There is also an
element of practicality in the Commission’s approach. Given the complexity of American
and foreign laws, there will inevitably be differences in any comparison. See Cross-Border
Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR and Certain Rules and
Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major SecurityBased Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. at 31,085. An outcomes-based approach, as the
Commission views it, would be the most efficient approach to achieving the goals of DoddFrank. See id. at 31,085–86.
122. See generally id.
123. See generally Application of Certain Title VII Requirements to Security-Based Swap
Transactions Connected with a Non-U.S. Person’s Dealing Activity That Are Arranged,
Negotiated, or Executed by Personnel Located in a U.S. Branch or Office or in a U.S.
Branch or Office of an Agent, 80 Fed. Reg. 27,444 (proposed May 13, 2015) (to be codified
at 17. C.F.R. pts. 240, 242) (stating that certain counterparties would be eligible for
substituted compliance if a determination were made).
124. See Council Directive 2004/39, art. 40, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1, 28.
125. See Council Regulation 648/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 1.
126. Commission Implementing Regulation 1247/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 352) 20;
Commission Delegated Regulation 148/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 52) 1; Commission Delegated
Regulation 149/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 52) 11. In the European Union, member states must
implement regulations uniformly, however, they have varying degrees of discretion when
implementing directives, depending on the specific directive. See DELOITTE, CFTC AND EU
OTC DERIVATIVES REGULATION: AN OUTCOMES-BASED COMPARISON 5 n.7 (July 2013),
http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/financial-services/deloitteuk-fs-cftc-and-eu-otc-derivatives-regulations.pdf [https://perma.cc/VRR8-SN2X].
127. See infra Part I.C.2. These were similar to SEC requirements, for example the
reporting of counterparty data to repositories. See, e.g., Council Regulation 148/2013, art. 1,
annex, 2013 O.J. (L 52) 1, 2, 4 tbl.1.
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and a directive129 created counterparty capital requirements.130 The
European Union later amended EMIR through a regulation known as
“MiFIR,”131 and then enacted “MiFID 2,”132 a companion directive to
MiFIR that goes into effect January 3, 2018.133 Finally, there are proposed
regulatory technical standards for counterparty margin requirements under
EMIR.134
Pursuant to the 2009 G20 Summit, these European regulations and
directives established a framework for OTC derivatives dealers similar to
regulatory frameworks enacted in the United States as a result of DoddFrank.135 Furthermore, regulators in the United States and European Union
discussed their OTC derivatives frameworks as the process unfolded.136
As discussed in Part I.B.3, to allow substituted compliance, the SEC must
find the laws of a foreign jurisdiction equivalent to the requirements
described in Part I.B.2. To that end, Part I.C.1–2 summarize the European
regulations and directives that the SEC would analyze for a substituted
compliance determination. As with the SEC’s regulations in Part I.B.2, Part
I.C.1 summarizes the European capital and margin requirements first, while
Part I.C.2 summarizes the remaining requirements.
1. Capital and Margin Requirements
The European Union recently proposed new margin requirements for
OTC derivatives in a public consultation.137 Therefore, between the United
States and the European Union, the European capital requirements are the
only enacted laws or regulations for either capital or margin.138
However, these requirements are similar to the SEC’s proposed capital
requirements in that they require counterparties maintain a minimum level

128. Council Regulation 575/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1.
129. Council Directive 2013/36, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338.
130. See ELLIOT, supra note 78 (discussing nature of capital requirements).
131. See Council Regulation 600/2014, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 84.
132. See Council Directive 2014/65, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349.
133. Updated Rules for Markets in Financial Instruments: MiFID 2, EUR. COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/securities/isd/mifid2/index_en.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/4W4X-779U].
134. See ESAs Consult on Margin Requirements for Non Centrally Cleared Derivatives,
EUR. BANKING AUTHORITY (June 10, 2015), https://www.eba.europa.eu/-/esas-consult-onmargin-requirements-for-non-centrally-cleared-derivatives
[https://perma.cc/WU53-4X
GR].
135. See DELOITTE, supra note 126.
136. See Joint Statement, United States (U.S.)—European Union (EU) Financial Markets
Regulatory Dialogue (Jan. 30, 2014) [hereinafter Joint Statement], http://ec.europa.eu/
finance/general-policy/docs/global/140129_us-eu-joint-statement_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/
H249-TQWY]. Regulators from both jurisdictions stressed the importance of implementing
the G20 commitments for OTC derivatives and minimizing divergences, as well as the need
to consult with each other. Id.
137. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
138. See Council Regulation 575/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1; Council Directive 2013/36,
2013 O.J. (L 176) 338.
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of net capital in a standalone rule.139 They also bring the capital
requirements in line with the Basel Accords, which generally require
financial firms to maintain higher levels of capital.140 Additionally, the
E.U. laws focus on the risks associated with the use of internal models141
and prudent valuation of transactions overall.142 In its proposed margin
consultation, the European Union acknowledged it would be introducing
margin requirements for OTC derivatives.143 It also described the different
forms of collateral available, and it stated the importance of risk
management for its margin requirements.144
2. Remaining Requirements
The European Union’s risk management systems provisions are located
in articles 9 and 11 of EMIR,145 article 16 of MiFID 2,146 and Regulation
1247 of 2012.147 There are numerous provisions for internal systems and
control mechanisms as well.148 As for SBS books and records, the
European Union requires counterparties to maintain that information
through EMIR,149 three other regulations,150 and MiFIR.151 Counterparties
139. See Council Regulation 575/2013, art. 412, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1, 240. This
requirement differs from the American capital requirements in that counterparties need not
keep their capital funds in third-party accounts. See 15 U.S.C. § 78c-5(f)(3) (2012).
However, counterparties in Europe must still hold the funds and cannot trade with them. See
Council Regulation 575/2013, art. 412, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1, 240. Despite the difference,
therefore, a duplicative result is created between the two schemes. See id.
140. See Council Regulation 575/2013, art. 500, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 1, 284.
141. See id. art. 221, at 138.
142. See id. art. 105, at 71.
143. See ESAs Consult on Margin Requirements for Non Centrally Cleared Derivatives,
supra note 134.
144. See id.
145. See Council Regulation 648/2012, art. 9, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 20–21
(“Counterparties . . . shall ensure that the details of any derivative contract they have
concluded . . . are reported to a trade repository.”); see also id. art. 11, at 22 (“Financial
counterparties . . . that enter into an OTC derivative contract not cleared by a CCP, shall
ensure, exercising due diligence, that appropriate procedures . . . are in place to measure,
monitor and mitigate operation risk and counterparty credit risk.”). Article 11 also requires
timely confirmation of OTC derivatives contracts and formalized processes to manage risks
and disputes between parties. See id.
146. See Council Directive 2014/65, art. 13, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349 (stating that firms
shall maintain effective approval processes, regularly review products that could affect the
potential risk to markets, and make all appropriate product information available).
147. See Council Regulation 1247/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 352) 20 (providing a detailed
explanation, including trade details and other information counterparties must monitor for
their OTC derivatives).
148. See Council Regulation 648/2012, art. 9, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 20 (stating that trade
information must be available to E.U. regulators); see also id. art. 11, at 22 (stating that
financial counterparties shall ensure that procedures and arrangements are in place to
measure, monitor, and mitigate operational and counterparty credit risk); Council Regulation
1247/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 352) 20 (stating that pertinent trade information be documented).
149. See Council Regulation 648/2012, arts. 9, 11, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 20–22.
150. See Council Regulation 148/2013, art. 1, annex, 2013 O.J. (L 52) 1, 2, 4 tbl.1 (setting
out details counterparties must provide for trade repositories); Commission Delegated
Regulation 149/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 52) 11 (mandating that OTC derivatives be confirmed
electronically to provide adequate records and access to the information); Council
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must also keep their books and records open to regulators for inspection and
examination.152 The SEC requires that counterparties exercise diligent
supervision.153 Counterparties in the European Union must “establish,
maintain, and enforce a system to supervise . . . diligently[] its business and
its associated persons”154 through applicable E.U. laws.155 Articles 16.3
and 23 of MiFID 2 further mandate that counterparties take care to avoid
conflicts of interest.156
MiFID 2 also requires that the managers of counterparties define and
oversee “the implementation of the governance arrangements that ensure
effective and prudent management” of the firm, and that management be
involved in compliance issues.157 Regulatory agencies in the European
Union also reserve the right to refuse authorization for members of
management to work if they are not of sufficiently good repute, or do not
possess sufficient knowledge and experience, among other qualifications.158
Finally, under article 16 of MiFID 2, counterparties in the European Union
are required to protect clients, make information available to them
regarding their transactions, and separate client assets from their own
accounts.159 These are similar to the SEC’s two transaction-level

Regulation 1247/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 352) 20 (mandating that OTC derivatives be reported on
a daily basis).
151. Council Regulation 600/2014, art. 25, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 84, 118 (“Investment firms
shall keep at disposal of the competent authority, for five years, the relevant data relating to
all orders and transactions which they have carried out.”).
152. See Council Directive 2014/65, art. 16, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349, 397 (“An investment
firm shall arrange for records to be kept of all . . . transactions undertaken by it which shall
be sufficient to enable the competent authority to fulfill its supervisory tasks and to perform
the enforcement actions under this Directive.”).
153. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968, 31,104 (proposed May
23, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249).
154. Id.
155. See Council Regulation 648/2012, art. 11, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 22 (stating that
counterparties must implement procedures and arrangements to monitor risks); see also
Council Directive 2014/65, art. 16, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349, 395 (stating that investment firms
shall maintain effective approval processes, regularly review products that could affect the
potential risk to markets, and make all appropriate product information available); Council
Regulation 648/2012, art. 1, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 14 (mandating that counterparties
arranging or executing transactions must establish and maintain effective arrangements, and
report anything suspicious to the appropriate regulators).
156. See Council Directive 2014/65, art. 16, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349, 396 (“An investment
firm shall maintain and operate effective organisational and administrative arrangements
with a view to taking all reasonable steps designed to prevent conflicts of interest.”); see also
id. art. 23, at 404 (defining conflicts of interest).
157. Id. art. 9, at 390.
158. Id.
159. See id. art. 16, at 395. Article 11.3 of EMIR also requires that counterparties “shall
have risk-management procedures that require the timely, accurate and appropriately
segregated exchange of collateral with respect to OTC derivative contracts.” See Council
Regulation 648/2012, art. 11, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 22.
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requirements for counterparties, external business conduct standards,160 and
the segregation of assets.161
II. THE UNITED STATES DECIDED
OTHER GOVERNMENTS SHOULD GET OFF
ITS OTC-DERIVATIVES REGULATORY LAWN
The CFTC and SEC broadly applied their cross-border requirements for
similar reasons.162 They intended to remedy certain realities: (1) major
financial firms can escape regulation of their higher-risk operations by
moving them to foreign jurisdictions; (2) successful regulation of systemic
risk requires regulation of both counterparties to a trade; (3) some nations
will profit from assuming the risks of nonregulation, creating “regulatory
arbitrage”;163 and (4) only major financial jurisdictions can push
international bodies and foreign jurisdictions, by leveraging territorial
jurisdiction.164 As the SEC itself stated, however, the OTC derivatives
market is highly international,165 and substituted compliance could ease the
burden of duplicative requirements for counterparties in cross-border
transactions.166 The Commission must, therefore, balance the motivations
for its territorial approach against the benefits of substituted compliance in
deciding whether to allow it and in what form. The decision of whether to
allow substituted compliance for SBS counterparties, and in what form, is
the central issue of this Note.
Support for and against substituted compliance lies across a spectrum.
There are some SBS industry members who urge the SEC to grant
Some
substituted compliance broadly in their comment letters.167

160. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968, 31,010 (proposed May
23, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249).
161. See id.
162. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1277–85.
163. Regulatory arbitrage is where other countries allow permissive laws for financial
firms, becoming “underregulated havens” to attract their business. Id. at 1260.
164. Id. “Territorial” is the term given the regulatory approach adopted by the SEC and
CFTC that uses the United States as a jurisdictional hook for oversight. Regulation SBSR
Release No. 34-74244, supra note 116, at *151 (“[T]he Commission continues to believe
that a territorial approach to the application of Title VII . . . is appropriate.”).
165. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968; see also Coffee, Jr.,
supra note 29, at 1273. Estimates put the exposure of U.S. bank counterparties to foreign
counterparties at between 55 and 75 percent of total derivatives exposure. Id. In 2011, only
around 7 percent of credit-default swaps were between two U.S. counterparties. Id. at 1273–
74.
166. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. at 30,974.
167. See, e.g., Investment Company Institute & ICI Global, Comment Letter on Proposed
Rules on Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers
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academics agree that the correct approach for American regulators to OTC
derivatives is an internationally coordinated effort like substituted
compliance.168 On the other end of the spectrum, the SEC also received
comment letters opposing any sort of substituted compliance determinations
by the Commission.169 In the middle, at least one academic advocates for a
diversity of regulatory forms in the OTC derivatives market, a concept both
in support of, and opposed to, an SEC substituted compliance scheme.170
These three main positions are summarized, in turn, in Part II.A, II.B, and
II.C.
A. Profits for All: Why the SEC
Should Broadly Grant Substituted Compliance
Often, participants of any industry have the operational knowledge to
anticipate problems that regulators cannot. To this end, some SBS market
participants argue in favor of substituted compliance. Some academics also
favor substituted compliance, and their arguments may be more convincing
as they are not self-interested market participants.
1. Arguments from Market Participants
Many of the commenters that advocate for substituted compliance are
financial industry advocacy groups.171 These lobbyists promote the
interests of a set of diverse financial services clients, including both dealers
and purchasers of SBSs.172 Already familiar with substituted compliance
from the CFTC, they favored the possibility of substituted compliance with
the SEC.173 As the cross-border aspects of SEC regulations increase,

and Major Security-Based Swap Participants 11–13 (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/
comments/s7-02-13/s70213-43.pdf [https://perma.cc/5H4R-RMZK].
168. See infra Part II.A.2. Many of these academics’ arguments focus on the CFTC’s
substituted compliance regime, rather than an SEC scheme. Their arguments are mainly
over the substance and philosophy of the concept of substituted compliance, however, and
not the form of the SEC or CFTC schemes. These arguments are applicable to the SEC’s
framework because the Commission has many of the same reasons for substituted
compliance as the CFTC.
169. See infra Part II.B.
170. See infra Part II.C.
171. See, e.g., ISDA, Comment Letter on Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities;
Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration
of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants (Aug. 14,
2013), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-13/s70213-31.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XTE-9L
3B].
172. See About ISDA, ISDA, http://www2.isda.org/about-isda/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2016)
[https://perma.cc/45TW-J3PN]. Most major SBS dealers, or a subsidiary entity, are
members of ISDA. See ISDA Members, ISDA, http://www2.isda.org/membership/memberslist/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/ZAC7-J824]. ISDA also includes other
professional associations, like law firms, accounting firms, supranational regulators, and
government agencies. See id.
173. See ISDA, supra note 171, at 2 (addressing “the need for harmonization with the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission” and the SEC regarding its proposal of substituted
compliance).
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commenters continue to request substituted compliance during rulemaking
periods.174
Their advocacy of substituted compliance is motivated by economic
concerns of overregulation with the SEC’s territorial approach to crossborder transactions.175 These groups argue that Dodd-Frank’s SBSs
requirements and those of foreign regulators are substantially similar and, in
practice, duplicative.176 When counterparties are required to comply with
the same requirements in multiple jurisdictions, no additional protections
result, and the extra work inhibits the flow of transactions.177 The SEC
could solve these business problems by establishing a comprehensive
substituted compliance framework.178 Additionally, substituted compliance
would “foster reciprocity and mutual recognition” between the SEC and
foreign regulators.179 Finally, if American counterparties retreat from the
global market because of their unwillingness to comply with duplicative
requirements, it could fragment the markets for SBSs into an American tier
and a foreign tier.180 This would decrease the overall liquidity of the global
market.181 Either result could expose the American economy to systemic
174. ICI Global, Comment Letter on Application of Certain Title VII Requirements to
Security-Based Swap Transactions Connected with a Non-U.S. Person’s Dealing Activity
That Are Arranged, Negotiated, or Executed by Personnel Located in a U.S. Branch or
Office or in a U.S. Branch or Office of an Agent (July 13, 2015), http://
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-15/s70615-15.pdf (arguing that the SEC should repropose
margin
rules
for
counterparties
to
allow
for
substituted
compliance)
[https://perma.cc/PGW3-XTBK]; ISDA, Comment Letter on the Proposed Rules, Rule
Amendments and Guidance on Regulation SBSR—Reporting and Dissemination of
Security-Based Swap Information 19–20 (May 4, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s703-15/s70315-7.pdf (arguing that territorial requirements should not be imposed until
relevant substituted compliance determinations have been made) [https://perma.cc/JNH7M22K]; see also Institute of International Bankers, Comment Letter on Application of
Certain Title VII Requirements to Security-Based Swap Transactions Connected with a NonU.S. Person’s Dealing Activity That Are Arranged, Negotiated, or Executed by Personnel
Located in a U.S. Branch or Office or in a U.S. Branch or Office of an Agent (July 13,
2015), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-15/s70615-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2FGNFTU]; Managed Funds Association, Comment Letter on Application of Certain Title VII
Requirements to Security-Based Swap Transactions Connected with a Non-U.S. Person’s
Dealing Activity That Are Arranged, Negotiated, or Executed by Personnel Located in a
U.S. Branch or Office or in a U.S. Branch or Office of an Agent 9 (July 13, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-15/s70615-26.pdf (advocating for the SEC’s approach
to substituted compliance) [https://perma.cc/68N4-F3HY].
175. See, e.g., ISDA, supra note 174, at 2 (citing the enormous implementation and
compliance challenges and cost for firms).
176. Id.
177. See ISDA, Comment Letter on the Application of Certain Title VII Requirements to
Security-Based Swap Transactions Connected With a Non-U.S. Person’s Dealing Activity
That Are Arranged, Negotiated, or Executed by Personnel Located in a U.S. Branch or
Office or in a U.S. Branch or Office of an Agent 5 (July 13, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-15/s70615-20.pdf (“Non-U.S. market participants may
not wish to subject themselves to the increased burden and complexity of U.S. regulation
when dealing with non-U.S. counterparties, particularly as they may be subject to
comparable regulation in their home jurisdictions.”) [https://perma.cc/Y3QD-TVHJ].
178. See generally ISDA, supra note 174.
179. See ISDA, supra note 177, at 10.
180. Id. at 5.
181. Id.
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risks because American financial companies will continue to rely on the
credit of foreign companies in other markets.182
2. Academics Who Advocate for Substituted Compliance
. . . or Something Like It
Some in the academic community also argue against the SEC’s territorial
approach to OTC derivatives regulations.183 Instead, they propose broader
and internationally integrated approaches such as harmonization, mutual
recognition, and minilateralism.184 Although the academics who argue for
these approaches may not advocate for substituted compliance
specifically,185 these approaches have justifications analogous to those for
substituted compliance.186
a. Harmonization
In cross-border regulatory systems, harmonization seeks to “achieve
substantial similarity in multiple regulatory systems so that market
participants face no additional burden in pursuing cross-border
activities.”187 To begin, harmonization includes a step fundamental to any
substituted compliance determination188: the bilateral assessment to
determine the compatibility of the regulations of two jurisdictions.189 This
assessment may require discussions to help ensure that no regulatory gaps
or systemic risks exist.190
After the initial assessment, efforts by the regulators of the two
jurisdictions to close gaps between frameworks and make them more
Harmonization,
similar, or even equivalent, is “harmonization.”191

182. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1260 (“This is because major financial institutions
are not only ‘too big to fail’ but also ‘too interconnected to fail.’”).
183. See, e.g., id. at 1296–97.
184. See infra Part II.A.2.a–c.
185. Professor John C. Coffee Jr. argues against substituted compliance as presently
contemplated but not necessarily against the concept. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at
1298–99. In contrast, Edward F. Greene has argued directly for implementation of a
substituted compliance framework. See Edward F. Greene, Beyond Borders: Time to Tear
Down the Barriers to Global Investing, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 85 (2007).
186. See infra Part II.A.2.
187. Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 308. Greene and Potiha wrote specifically about
the CFTC’s cross-border approach to margin requirements, but this Note generally applies
their arguments to the SEC’s entire cross-border approach. Also, Greene and Potiha both
contribute scholarship and work in private practice and are, therefore, not full-time
academics. See id. at 271.
188. See Greene, supra note 185, at 90–91.
189. Id. This assessment could be done by either a “forest” (generalized) approach or a
strict rule-by-rule comparison. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. Greene believes that a strict rule-by-rule comparison of a jurisdiction’s
regulations, followed by harmonization of those regulations, would be “indistinguishable
from a requirement of regulatory convergence,” or two jurisdictions creating requirements in
tandem. Id. at 91. He disavows this approach both because Americans should “take pride” in
their system and because harmonization frustrates a main purpose of any substituted
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therefore, can go further than substituted compliance, since two
jurisdictions can converge regulations.192 For example, if regulators at the
SEC and in the European Union conformed the margin requirements for
SBSs, then counterparties would calculate and maintain the same levels of
funds to comply with both jurisdictions.193 Harmonization also could be
achieved through the implementation of transactional standards by
supranational regulators.194 In the context of OTC derivatives, this may
require an international body to set minimum requirements for
counterparties.195 Minimum requirements through harmonization would
decrease risks of competition, duplication, and fragmentation.196 In either
form of harmonization, however, the objectives of substituted compliance
are also accomplished, as SBS counterparties would be subject to only one
regulatory scheme.197
b. Mutual Recognition
Conceptually, “mutual recognition”198 is substantially similar to
substituted compliance. Edward F. Greene and Ilona Potiha ultimately
believe mutual recognition, rather than harmonization, is the correct
approach to cross-border regulatory issues in the United States.199
Recognition can be unilateral or mutual between jurisdictions.200 Mutual
recognition by one government, “unilateral recognition,” would result in
one jurisdiction determining another’s regulations are equivalent to its own
and, therefore, that no further regulation is required on its part.201
Greene and Potiha also enumerate risks associated with the territorial
approach to cross-border transactions.202 Mutual recognition would
alleviate some of these risks by removing duplicative regulations from
cross-border transactions, discouraging regulatory arbitrage, and promoting
compliance regime. Id. Namely, he believes it frustrates the “race to optimality” goal that
comes from regulatory experimentation. Id.
192. See id.
193. See supra Part I.B.2.a, I.C.1.
194. See Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 308.
195. Id.
196. Id. Greene and Potiha argue that harmonization is unlikely to ever reach its
theoretical goals, however, because regulators will not set their own requirements quickly
enough to prevent counterparties from becoming uncompetitive and losing clients. See id. at
309 n.166.
197. See id. at 308 (describing harmonization as a framework “under which the rules can
operate across borders without unduly restricting cross-border activity and flow of funds”).
198. Mutual recognition involves a determination by one jurisdiction that another
jurisdiction’s regulatory regime is sufficient to regulate counterparties from that jurisdiction
without additional regulation by the host country regulator. Id. at 310.
199. Id. at 310–11. As discussed, Greene and Potiha use the SEC’s prior substituted
compliance determination as an example of mutual recognition. See supra note 70 and
accompanying text.
200. See Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 310.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 299–304. These include competitive disadvantages, driving business away,
duplicative requirements, and market fragmentation. Id. If the market for SBSs were to
leave the United States, it could deprive the SEC of oversight over the market.
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a more coordinated approach to regulation.203 It also encourages some
differences between laws, as jurisdictions need only find each other’s laws
Thus, the SEC’s and European Union’s margin
“equivalent.”204
requirements could be equivalent, even though counterparties in the
European Union hold funds for capital requirements in their own accounts
as opposed to the accounts of a third-party custodian under the SEC’s
requirements.205
Implementing a mutual recognition scheme, however, would be difficult
given the technical nature of comparing regimes.206 It also is uncertain
whether mutual recognition is possible, given that the rationale behind the
SEC’s territorial approach is the systematic prevention of contagion and
interconnected risk.207 This rationale creates a “tension” because mutual
recognition relies on deferring to foreign laws and governments.208 Mutual
recognition of foreign regulations by American agencies would, ultimately,
promote the efficiency of cross-border markets by removing duplicative
requirements.209
c. Not Maxi-, but Minilateralism
Professor John C. Coffee Jr. proposes an alternative approach to
substituted compliance.210 He believes the costs of substituted compliance
may outweigh the benefits.211 Instead, Coffee argues that successful
international collaboration among governments can be achieved through a
“minilateral” approach to financial regulation.212 Coffee compares the
territorial approach of American regulators to imperialism, which will be
resisted in other parts of the world.213 However, the accepted approach of

203. Id. at 310. Mutual recognition would, presumably, decrease regulatory arbitrage if it
was implemented on a large scale but may increase it if implemented only on a smaller scale.
It would also, however, include an enforcement mechanism not necessarily included in the
harmonization context. Id.
204. Id. These small differences would allow the benefits of the “race to optimality” of
regulation described by Edward F. Greene. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
205. See supra Part I.B.2.a, I.C.1.
206. See Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 310. Regulators would need to understand
another jurisdiction’s SBS laws, which would require time and resources, although this
problem would exist in any substituted compliance determination as well.
207. See id. at 311.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 310.
210. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1265.
211. See id. In his view, the risks with substituted compliance arise not only because
financial services companies would seek to escape regulation but also because different
jurisdictions move at different lawmaking speeds. Id. at 1274, 1299. A slower decisionmaking process is to be expected in Europe, for example, because it is naturally a more
fragmented polity. Id.
212. Id. at 1265. Minilateralism is contrasted with the more common concept
“multilateralism,” where countries discuss issues and ultimately forge agreements such as
treaties. Id. at 1265–66.
213. Id. at 1263–65.
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“soft law”214 does not have the force or speed to solve issues like the causes
of the financial crisis.215
A minilateral approach would first ask, “[W]hat is the smallest number of
nations needed to reach a workable solution to a specific problem?”216
Regarding systemic risk caused by OTC derivatives, only the major
financial jurisdictions like the United States and Europe have the incentives
to address the issues that originated in unregulated OTC derivatives
markets.217 Therefore, the United States and European Union should act
minilaterally to define functional equivalence to support substituted
compliance.218 This could prevent attempts by the SEC to run “roughshod”
over foreign laws or an attempt by the financial services industry to evade
Dodd-Frank requirements.219 An agreement between the European Union
and United States also would provide a template for other jurisdictions to
follow.220 Finally, if the European Union and United States deny access to
their financial institutions, these other jurisdictions could be motivated to
adopt the template by loss of market share.221
B. Clear and Present Dangers: Why the SEC
Should Not Grant Substituted Compliance
The commenters who oppose substituted compliance argue that it could
undermine Dodd-Frank by effectively outsourcing oversight to foreign
regulators and that it overlooks the potential for systemic risk and financial

214. Soft laws with respect to issues of financial regulation are “broad, noncompulsory,
and sometimes aspirational, principles that are announced by international bodies, such as
the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank.” Id. at 1265.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1267 (“[T]he United States and the EU have the best incentives for controlling
systemic risk because they will likely bear the lion’s share of the costs from a financial
contagion.”). Other countries with less developed financial infrastructures largely escaped
damage from OTC derivatives, and other forms of financial engineering, during the financial
crisis. Id. at 1266.
218. Id. at 1267, 1298–99.
219. Id. at 1267.
220. Id. at 1298 (“In the world of OTC derivatives, an agreement between the United
States and Europe would effectively compel the rest of the world to conform to their agreed
standards.”).
221. Id. at 1270.

934

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

These commenters are usually financial industry
contagion.222
accountability groups223 that desire enforcement of financial laws.224
First, they argue that foreign OTC derivatives laws may not be
sufficiently equivalent to American laws to support substituted
compliance.225 “Even regimes of comparable robustness” will contain
asymmetries that could generate loopholes, and financial companies are
“notorious” for finding and exploiting these loopholes.226 For example,
financial companies may create subsidiaries in different jurisdictions to take
advantage of different laws.227
Second, even if foreign laws are sufficiently similar to American laws,
the Commission has not done enough to ensure that foreign laws are
enforced similarly.228 The SEC makes only “passing reference” to foreign
enforcement when it should consider other factors.229 Enforcement of
existing laws, therefore, concerns these commenters because the laws are
meaningless without their enforcement.230
Third, they argue that Congress chose not to establish substituted
compliance in Dodd-Frank.231 They also criticize the SEC’s process for
substituted compliance, arguing it is not public or transparent enough, and
that only after its scheme is subject to more rigorous standards can the
Commission have “adequate legal or policy justification” for substituted

222. See, e.g., Americans for Financial Reform, Comment Letter on Cross-Border
Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR and Certain Rules and
Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers and Major SecurityBased Swap Participants (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-13/s7021354.pdf (“[T]he SEC should not place the interests of financial institutions . . . over the
statutory mandate of Dodd-Frank.”) [https://perma.cc/7PDG-EPHG]; Better Markets,
Comment Letter on Cross-Border Security Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of
Regulation SBSR and Certain Rule and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based
Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants (Aug. 21, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-13/s70213-42.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJL6-GXC6].
223. See About AFR, AMERICANS FIN. REFORM, http://ourfinancialsecurity.org/about/ (last
visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/2DN3-JJNR]; About Us, BETTER MARKETS,
https://www.bettermarkets.com/about-us (last visited October 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/
2KWL-5MVF].
224. See About AFR, supra note 223 (describing the group as “a nonpartisan and
nonprofit coalition of more than 200 civil rights, consumer, labor, business, investor, faithbased, and civic and community groups” formed in the wake of the financial crisis to work
for a strong and ethical financial system).
225. See Better Markets, supra note 222, at 24–29. They also have “serious concerns
regarding the procedure for such comparability determinations” laid out in the SEC CrossBorder proposal. Americans for Financial Reform, supra note 222.
226. Better Markets, supra note 222, at 25.
227. See id. (discussing the 2,993 subsidiaries JPMorgan Chase uses to exploit regulatory
differences between jurisdictions around the world).
228. Id. at 30–31.
229. Id. at 30. These include “staff expertise, agency funding, agency independence,
technological capacity, supervision in fact, and enforcement in fact.” Id. at 31. They also
argue that enforcement is consistent and ongoing. Id.
230. Id. at 32. Also, they discuss the issue of changes to foreign laws after the SEC has
allowed substituted compliance. Id.
231. See id. at 25.
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compliance.232 In addition, they criticize the outcomes-based approach.233
The SEC should use the more “narrow” rule-by-rule comparison approach,
which will ensure long-term comparability, rather than the “overly vague”
outcomes test.234
C. One Size of OTC Derivatives Regulation Does Not Fit All
A substituted compliance determination deems the laws of another
jurisdiction essentially equivalent to, or uniform with, those of the SEC.235
Professor Sean Griffith argues against uniform global regulation for OTC
derivatives.236 Providing for a diversity of regulatory approaches offers
benefits otherwise unavailable in a uniform system.237 To address systemic
risk, governments must understand that regulators not only make mistakes
but also often repeat them.238
A diversity of approaches would allow for compartmentalization of risks
as regulators in different jurisdictions impose different requirements.239
This would create the inverse of regulatory arbitrage: regulators would
innovate requirements that stem risk and provide information about
successful approaches rather than opening their borders to companies
seeking the least regulation, fueling a race toward the regulatory bottom.240
This could, for example, prevent contagions of the sort that spread to
American markets through a British subsidiary of AIG.241 Regulators
around the world, working independently, would pull global regulation
upward by creating structural barriers to contagion and risk.242
In comparison, Griffith believes substituted compliance leads to two
questions: “[W]hat is sufficiently similar? And . . . who decides?”243
Whichever regulatory bodies make the determinations, they should consider
whether the foreign laws increase systemic risk or undermine the U.S.
financial system in some other way.244 Ultimately, the decision should not
232. See id. at 24; see also Americans for Financial Reform, supra note 222.
233. See Better Markets, supra note 222, at 30–31.
234. See id. at 30.
235. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
236. See Griffith, supra note 6, at 1293.
237. Id. at 1294. These include the promotion of innovation, the adoption of efficient
regulatory structures, and the production of information about different approaches to issues.
Id.
238. Id. at 1347–49.
239. Id. at 1372.
240. Id. at 1372–73. Regulatory arbitrage is the malevolent outcome of independent
systems of regulatory rules over the same financial market. See supra note 163 and
accompanying text.
241. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
242. Griffith, supra note 6, at 1372–73.
243. Id. at 1369. In Griffith’s opinion, neither the CFTC nor the SEC should be making
substituted compliance determinations. Id. at 1370. He argues that the review committee
must be independent of the agency responsible for “drafting and implementing the domestic
regulation.” Id.
244. Id. at 1369. Griffith also believes that whether the CFTC or SEC makes substituted
compliance determinations, neither entity’s authority or discretion should extend
internationally. Id. at 1372.
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be whether the laws of another jurisdiction are functionally equivalent but
whether they provide a “robust approach to the underlying problem of
systemic risk.”245
III. A NARROW AND NECESSARY COMPROMISE
To address the issue surveyed in Part II, this Note proposes that the SEC
follow the general path of the CFTC246 and institute substituted compliance.
Because many large financial companies transact in both swaps and
SBSs,247 they currently operate under two different approaches to crossborder transactions for economically equivalent products.248 Economic
efficiency would be increased if these inconsistent approaches were
remedied through substituted compliance.
The SEC’s substituted compliance policy, however, should be narrower
in form than that of the CFTC. It should grant substituted compliance for
European dealers, and American dealers with European subsidiaries,
transacting in cross-border OTC SBSs. This approach would not only
fulfill the purposes of Dodd-Frank but also protect against global systemic
risk while maintaining the competitiveness of American financial
companies.249
This resolution is presented in two parts. Part III.A, argues that
substituted compliance should be allowed solely for dealers, while Part
III.B argues that the European Union is the only jurisdiction for which the
SEC should allow substituted compliance.
A. Why Not Substituted Compliance
for All Market Participants?
Although substituted compliance can create benefits and prevent issues in
the SBS markets and the American economy, the risk of another financial
crisis should prevent the SEC’s extension of substituted compliance beyond
dealers. To develop this argument, Part III.A.1 discusses the benefits of
allowing substituted compliance for dealers. Part III.A.2 then presents the
potential risks of the SEC not allowing it for dealers, before ending with
why the SEC should not allow substituted compliance for other market
participants.

245. Id.
246. If the Commission undertakes substituted compliance, it will be different in form
from the CFTC’s scheme. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
247. See Thompson, supra note 53.
248. See ISDA, supra note 171, at 4 (citing the uncertainties, confusion, and
inefficiencies of the differences between the CFTC and SEC).
249. This Note adopts a similar position to that of Professor Coffee, see supra Part
II.A.2.c, but one that differs significantly in form and reasoning, see infra Part III.B.
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1. The Economy, Stupid
Large financial institutions, such as dealers in the SBS market, are
typically identified as “the cause” of the financial crisis.250 They carry
massive influence over the market by selling vast quantities of OTC
SBSs.251 Indeed, they amplified the damage of the financial crisis by
exposing markets around the world to SBSs.252 As discussed, substituted
compliance for SBS dealers would allow them to avoid costly regulatory
requirements and would, therefore, benefit them.253 It would be a
conspicuous advantage to a group responsible for fundamental causes of the
financial crisis.254
The SEC, however, should ultimately harmonize255 with the CFTC, and
institute substituted compliance.256 First, if the SEC granted substituted
compliance for another jurisdiction, it affirms that jurisdiction has
requirements equivalent to those of Dodd-Frank.257 The protections DoddFrank mandates to prevent another financial crisis would, therefore,
exist.258 Second, current duplicative requirements put American dealers at
a competitive disadvantage in the market.259 The SEC exempted all but the
largest dealers of SBSs from its requirements anyway, through the
minimum thresholds for registration.260 These dealers have the resources to
avoid SEC regulations by taking advantage of regulatory arbitrage.261
Alternatively, if the SEC prevents regulatory arbitrage, American dealers

250. See Crash Course, supra note 4. Additionally, it is accepted that CDSs and CDOs
were the financial instruments to blame. See id.; see also Griffith, supra note 6 at 1304–05.
251. An estimated 80 percent of SBSs, by notional volume, have ISDA-recognized
dealers as counterparties on both sides of transactions. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts
Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Rules (June 25, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/
PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370542163722 [https://perma.cc/6ASD-9QAD].
252. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1262.
253. See supra Part I.B.3. This especially includes capital and margin requirements. See
supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
254. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1262. Additionally, there is political stigma that
can occur with the appearance of support for large financial institutions. See Senator Sherrod
Brown et al., Comment Letter on Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal
of Regulation SBSR and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of SecurityBased Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants 1–2 (May 22, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-13/s70213-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KV6-5JBD].
255. Greene and Potiha described the form this would take. See supra Part.II.A.2.a.
256. See CFTC, Comparability Determinations, supra note 67.
257. See supra notes 117–21 and accompanying text.
258. See Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation SBSR
and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap Dealers
and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968, 30,972 (proposed May
23, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249) (“The Dodd-Frank Act was
enacted . . . to promote the financial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system.”).
259. See Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 302 (explaining that “duplicative margin
collection requirements would make it costly and burdensome to demonstrate compliance”
with multiple regimes).
260. See supra note 76.
261. See supra note 164 and accompanying text; see also supra note 226 and
accompanying text.
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may decide SBSs are too costly because of the Commission’s
regulations.262 Dealers would leave the market to create and sell less
regulated, more profitable products.263 In either scenario, the liquidity of
the SBS market would diminish, and “fragmentation” would occur.264
As a result, counterparties would be less able to mitigate risks through
hedging.265 Their trading profits through speculation also would be
limited.266 This would be in addition to the losses of SBS profits as
counterparties left the market due to regulatory costs. Finally, the SEC
would have less regulatory oversight in a fragmented market or a market in
which a substantial number of American SBS dealers exit. Whether
through the SBS market or not, large financial companies are inextricably
connected to other financial companies throughout the world.267 As long as
the SBS market persists without sufficient oversight, American companies
and, therefore, the American economy, will be exposed to its risks through
the exposure of American financial companies to foreign financial
companies in the numerous other financial markets.268
2. What Could Be Lost Without Substituted Compliance
Some argue the economic benefit provided by American SBS dealers is
dwarfed by the importance of what is mandated by Dodd-Frank.269 Despite
the damage of the financial crisis, hedging is fundamental to risk
management for financial companies, and cross-border SBSs are necessary
to provide market liquidity for hedging.270 That is why the G20 leaders
elected to regulate SBSs rather than ban them.271 Though some downplay
the economic benefits of SBSs, these benefits could be significantly
reduced by the regulatory burdens of Dodd-Frank.272

262. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1276–77.
263. As Professor Coffee explains, the sophistication of large financial institutions gives
them options to avoid regulation. See id. at 1262.
264. Fragmentation of markets occurs when entities augment their businesses because of
local regulation, and generally results in decreased safety and liquidity of markets. See
Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 303. The illiquidity of markets, as discussed, is an issue
commenters have previously brought up with the Commission as undermining the objectives
of Dodd-Frank. See ISDA, supra note 179.
265. This could also substantially tighten the credit markets, as credit underwriters have
fewer options to hedge their risk positions. See Ellen Brown, Credit Default Swaps:
Evolving Financial Meltdown and Derivative Disaster Du Jour, GLOBAL RES. (Dec. 5,
2012), http://www.globalresearch.ca/credit-default-swaps-evolving-financial-meltdown-andderivative-disaster-du-jour/8634 [https://perma.cc/B442-WRP7].
266. Speculation through use of SBSs was a magnifying factor of the financial crisis. See
supra note 33 and accompanying text.
267. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1272–74.
268. See id. This includes the risks that led to the financial crisis. See id.
269. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
270. See supra note 6; see also Greene & Potiha, supra note 60, at 290–91.
271. See Leaders’ Statement, G-20, supra note 10.
272. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1283.
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Furthermore, the loss of American SBS dealers is a risk that could harm
the economy further.273 If the SEC both diminished the liquidity of the
SBS market, and effectively ceded jurisdiction over the market, it could
undermine Dodd-Frank.274 These issues would be avoided through
substituted compliance, as would the image of American regulatory
imperialism.275 Substituted compliance would strike a regulatory balance
between economic benefits and risk protections.276
Given the advantages substituted compliance creates for the American
economy, the SEC could grant it broadly to purchasers of SBSs.277 The
Commission denied this possibility in its initial guidance on substituted
compliance,278 and it should not extend substituted compliance to all
market participants at this time. First, if smaller purchasers exit the market
because of regulatory costs, it will not harm market liquidity or shrink the
American economy as much as an exit of large dealers.279 Second, though
large financial companies can be publicly unpopular, they have more
incentive to comply with SEC regulations, or equivalent foreign laws, than
SBS participants. Large financial firms have visible brands and reputations
based on public perception of compliance with laws and regulations that
smaller and less well-known counterparties do not have.280 Finally, the
absence of regulation was a cause of the financial crisis, and granting
substituted compliance to all participants could cede oversight for relatively
minimal economic benefits.281
B. If the European Union, Why Not the World?
The SEC, in striking the correct regulatory balance, could capture most
of the SBS market through a substituted compliance determination with the
European Union.282 This is possible because almost all of the large dealers
273. See id.; see also ISDA, supra note 179, at 5 (stating that dealers may move
employees out of the United States to avoid “burdensome and duplicative regulation”).
274. See supra notes 263–64 and accompanying text.
275. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1264 (discussing a prior foreign concern about a
“tradition of U.S. imperialism under which the United States assumed that its preferred
financial practices could be mandated for the rest of the world”); see also id. at 1266 (“[T]he
United States cannot effectively exercise that authority in the face of unified international
opposition.”).
276. See supra notes 250, 254 and accompanying text.
277. Some commenters also argue for this. See, e.g., Managed Funds Association,
Comment Letter on Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of
Regulation SBSR and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of SecurityBased Swap Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants 2 (Aug. 19, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-02-13/s70213-34.pdf (stating that substituted compliance
must “encompass[] all transaction-level requirements that apply to U.S. and non-U.S.
persons conducting transactions within the United States”) [https://perma.cc/VV4E-N4EQ].
278. See supra note 112.
279. This is because the market is heavily based around dealers, who both sell and
purchase SBSs. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
280. See, e.g., Crash Course, supra note 4.
281. See supra Part II.B.
282. Although Switzerland is not part of the European Union, the Commission should
consider it effectively part of the European Union because of its substantial legal and
economic ties, see Switzerland, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-
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are based in either of the two jurisdictions,283 and most SBSs are between
two dealers.284 Moreover, the current E.U. SBS laws are equivalent to
American requirements for dealers using the approach stated by the SEC.285
Through this limited action, the Commission could provide many of the
benefits advocated for in Part II, while avoiding many of the risks of its
territorial approach.286
Part III.B.1 argues for the equivalence of E.U. laws to SEC regulations.
Following this, Part III.B.2 analyzes why there are no enforcement issues
with the European Union. Finally, Part III.B.3 explains why the SEC need
not make any other substituted compliance determinations.
1. Existing Equivalence
As discussed, the SEC’s outcomes-based approach287 has been criticized
as vague288 and has never been applied in any public statement by the
After applying the approach as described by the
Commission.289
Commission, however, the European Union’s information reporting and
recordkeeping requirements for SBS dealers are functionally equivalent to
the SEC’s current regulations under Dodd-Frank.290 This would leave only
capital and margin requirements for a substituted compliance
determination.291 As discussed, the European capital requirements are the
only requirements enacted between both governments for either capital or
and-regions/countries/switzerland/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2016) [https://perma.cc/
NTB7-PPHZ], and grant it substituted compliance as well under the greater umbrella of the
European Union. Switzerland is home to two large dealers: Credit Suisse and UBS. The
same is now true of the United Kingdom, which recently departed from the European Union.
See Fraser Nelson, Brexit: A Very British Revolution, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2016, 4:33 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/brexit-a-very-british-revolution-1466800383 [https://perma.cc/
3SWU-NAW6]. As of fall 2016, it is too early to know what the United Kingdom’s
financial regulations and laws will look like after leaving the European Union. However,
because the United Kingdom is also home to three large dealers, Barclays Capital, HSBC,
and RBS, it would be appropriate for the SEC to grant the United Kingdom substituted
compliance, assuming it maintains its current laws and political status as essentially
equivalent to the European Union.
283. This group of dealers includes the following American-based financial institutions:
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America Merrill Lynch,
Citigroup, and Wells Fargo. It also includes the following European-based (including
Switzerland and the United Kingdom) financial institutions: Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank,
Barclays Capital, HSBC, BNP Paribas, the Royal Bank of Scotland, Societe Generale, and
UBS. Of the world’s largest dealers, this would leave only the Japanese Nomura and the
Canadian RBC outside of the ambit of the SEC’s regulations.
284. See Application of “Security-Based Swap Dealer” and “Major Security-Based Swap
Participant” Definitions to Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities, 79 Fed. Reg.
47,278, 47,284 n.52 (Aug. 12, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 241, 250) (stating
that the Commission estimates 80 percent of the SBS market is between thirteen large
entities).
285. See infra Part III.B.1.
286. See supra Part II.A.
287. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 109, 123 and accompanying text.
290. See supra Part I.C.
291. See supra Part I.B.2–3.
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margin.292 It would be in the best interests of the European Union, the
SEC, and counterparties for the two governments to coordinate regulation
in efforts that resembled mutual recognition and make them functionally
equivalent.293 These efforts also would affirm the SEC’s commitment to
coordination with foreign regulators.294 Based on SEC guidance and the
current state of European and American capital and margin requirements,
however, they are functionally equivalent.
2. These Equivalent Laws Will Be Enforced
Even if European SBS laws were equivalent to American laws, however,
there would need to be equivalent enforcement of them.295 The preliminary
hurdle in equivalent enforcement is the discretion member states have to
implement directives.296 If member states implement softer versions, the
enforcement of directives would differ, and the possibility of regulatory
arbitrage between member states would increase.297 There are mechanisms
in the European Union, however, to prevent this from occurring. First, the
level of discretion afforded member states differs on a directive-bydirective basis.298 The pertinent directives at issue in this Note afford little
discretion to E.U. member states in implementation.299 Additionally, none
of them have provisions that allow member states to opt out of directives,300
and these regulations and directives have enforcement provisions.301 The
European Union also has pan-European legislation to ensure proper
financial regulation,302 and it already had OTC derivatives regulations in
MiFID 1 prior to the financial crisis, when the United States had none.303
There are also political and economic pressures between the United
States and European Union that help ensure equivalent enforcement. The
292. See supra Part I.B–C.
293. See supra Part II.A.2.b. Through this endeavor, the Commission would also be
applying a purer form of the minilateral approach for which Professor Coffee advocates. See
supra Part II.A.2.c.
294. See, e.g., Cross-Border Security-Based Swap Activities; Re-Proposal of Regulation
SBSR and Certain Rules and Forms Relating to the Registration of Security-Based Swap
Dealers and Major Security-Based Swap Participants, 78 Fed. Reg. 30,968, 30,974
(proposed May 23, 2013) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249).
295. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
296. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
297. Regulatory arbitrage is a focus of those opposed to substituted compliance. See
Americans for Financial Reform, supra note 222.
298. See Josephine Hartmann, Discretion in EU Law—A Total Mismatch?, UNIVERSITEIT
LEIDEN L. BLOG (Feb. 5, 2013), http://leidenlawblog.nl/articles/discretion-in-eu-law-a-totalmismatch [https://perma.cc/W5TD-2BM9].
299. See, e.g., Council Directive 2004/39, arts. 5, 9–10, 12–13, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1, 12–
14.
300. See generally Council Directive 2014/65, 2014 O.J. (L 173) 349; Council Directive
2013/36, 2013 O.J. (L 176) 338; Council Directive 2004/39, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1.
301. See Council Directive 2004/39, art. 51, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1, 33 (describing the use
of criminal sanctions for breaches of the directive); see also Council Regulation 648/2012,
art. 12, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1, 24.
302. See European Economic Area, EFTA, http://www.efta.int/eea (last visited Oct. 16,
2016) [https://perma.cc/4GKW-GC84].
303. See Council Directive 2004/39, 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1.
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European Union is one of the only other jurisdictions that suffered
economic consequences from the financial crisis as harsh as the United
States.304 It also has similar levels of financial and economic development
as the United States305 and is a close political and economic ally of the
United States. Finally, American and European regulators already consult
on SBS regulations.306
3. European and American Market Influence
Substituted compliance between the SEC and European Union would
capture the majority of global SBSs within the ambit of Dodd-Frank. The
two jurisdictions regulate the majority of the world’s large dealers.307
These dealers are the largest financial institutions in the world and have vast
resources in an industry with high regulatory barriers to entry.308 It is,
therefore, unlikely that dealers would develop rapidly in jurisdictions
outside of regime’s scope.309 Again, substituted compliance between the
SEC and the European Union would accomplish sound regulation with
limited Commission action.310 Given the two jurisdictions’ political and
economic ties, the ongoing regulatory dialogue also would likely ensure
flexibility to address any necessary changes in the future.311
Additionally, many of the incentives for substituted compliance with the
European Union do not exist for other jurisdictions, and, therefore, the
Commission should not make any other determinations. First, it is not clear
that any other jurisdictions have SBS laws equivalent to the American laws,
like the European Union does.312 Second, no other jurisdiction has the
density of large SBS dealers.313 Third, the SEC risks undermining DoddFrank,314 criticism from the public or Congress, and litigation with any
determination.315 Fourth, the close political and economic ties of the
United States and European Union do not exist with every jurisdiction in
the world.316 Therefore, it is harder to rely on the enforcement of
equivalent laws, or trust other governments to act in a coordinated manner.

304. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1266.
305. See id.
306. See Joint Statement, supra note 136. European and American regulators stressed the
importance of implementing the G20 commitments for OTC derivatives, minimizing
divergences to the extent possible and the need to consult with each other. Id.
307. See supra note 283.
308. See supra notes 225–26 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
310. See supra Part III.B.
311. See supra note 306.
312. See supra Part III.B.1.
313. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
314. See supra Part II.B; see also Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1267 (“At worst, it could
enable the financial services industry to achieve an effective end run around the Dodd-Frank
Act’s requirements.”).
315. See Brown et al., supra note 254.
316. Though the United States obviously has close economic ties with jurisdictions like
Australia, Canada, and Japan.
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Other governments also may tailor their SBS laws to Dodd-Frank
without any further Commission action. If the SEC and E.U. regulators
acknowledge a shared framework, it would establish it as the leading
standard internationally.317 Jurisdictions may adopt a similar framework as
an attempt to not only properly regulate markets but also create the potential
for substituted compliance with the SEC.318 Regardless of whether other
jurisdictions match their laws to Dodd-Frank, foreign dealers will continue
to transact in the United States and Europe out of necessity.319 The United
States and European Union have the largest capital markets in the world,320
and transactions will continue because of precedent. Other jurisdictions
could choose to benefit from regulatory arbitrage,321 but it is unlikely given
the discussed motivations and the nature of the SBS market. Finally, if
regulators around the world are left to create individual systems, it could
provide the compartmentalization of risks brought by regulatory
diversity.322
CONCLUSION
The ruin inflicted by the financial crisis cannot be overstated. Average
people who had not participated in the opaque SBS market bore much of
the financial brunt.323 The motivations of the G20 to enact legislation like
Dodd-Frank were commendable.324 The unintended consequences of
Dodd-Frank, however, threaten to erode existing benefits of the financial
markets. Given the financial crisis, the global financial markets are better
served if the SEC maintains as much oversight as is politically and
economically expedient.
Through substituted compliance with the
European Union, the SEC would uphold the goals of Dodd-Frank while
preventing excessive regulation and protecting the competitiveness of the
American economy.

317. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1288 (stating that the United States and European
Union could “notify other countries (e.g., Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Canada, Brazil) as
to the minimum requirements that they would require to consider another regulatory regime
functionally equivalent”).
318. See id. Also, other governments may want to build political and economic goodwill
with the United States and European Union.
319. See id. at 1270 (“Bluntly put, the United States and the EU together have the market
power to achieve [global derivatives regulation].”).
320. See supra notes 307–09 and accompanying text.
321. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
322. See supra Part II.C.
323. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
324. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 29, at 1273.

